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A MORE JUST SYSTEM OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: CREATING A NEW STANDARD
OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUVENILES IN
ILLINOIS
BROOKE TROUTMAN*
For over a century, America’s legal system has made substantial
reforms to change its treatment of adolescents. Every day, we see that our
legal system treats adolescents differently from their adult counterparts.
With regards to driving privileges, voting rights, and the ability to drink, our
laws recognize that adults and adolescents are different and therefore
require a different set of standards. America extended this treatment to the
realm of juvenile justice in 1899, when Cook County, Illinois, created the
country’s first juvenile court. Originating in this court was the overarching
purpose of America’s juvenile justice system—rehabilitation of juvenile
offenders.
Though over a century has passed since the creation of America’s first
juvenile court, only recently has the law begun to treat juveniles differently
from their adult counterparts. In the past decade, landmark Supreme Court
decisions Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
and Miller v. Alabama have implemented constitutional shields for juveniles
against the death penalty, life without parole, and improper Miranda
waivers. In implementing these safeguards, the Supreme Court has employed
new scientific understandings of juveniles, as well as common sense, to
conclude that juveniles are different from adults and should be treated
differently by the law.
Though the Supreme Court created safeguards for juveniles in death
penalty and life without parole circumstances, situations still exist that
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threaten the lives of juvenile offenders. Illinois accountability theory is one
such situation. In Illinois, accountability theory is the mechanism by which
the State can convict an offender of a crime which they did not actually
commit. In Illinois, an individual who exhibited more than “mere presence”
at the scene of the crime can be convicted of the same crime and sentenced
in the same manner as the individual who committed the crime. Given the
recent landmark Supreme Court cases, new scientific findings relating to the
psychological understanding of juveniles, as well as simple common sense,
accountability theory should not be used to prosecute juvenile offenders in
Illinois.1
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INTRODUCTION
It is not a new or innovative concept to say that juveniles are different
from adults in a legal sense or even in common sense.2 William Blackstone,
the architect of common law, built his theory of criminal justice upon the
foundation that only two types of people were incapable of committing
crimes—those that were insane and those that were considered “infants.”3
Though in the present day, an infant may be defined as someone who is a
baby or a young child in the most basic stage of life, Blackstone’s definition

1

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261,
264–65 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
551 (2005).
2
ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, DIALOGUE ON YOUTH AND JUSTICE 4 (2007).
3
See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22; Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone
as Architect: Constructing the Commentaries, 15 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 103 (2003).
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was far wider reaching.4 Blackstone believed that “infants,” a category of
people not capable of committing crimes, encompassed all young people
possessing a “defect of the understanding.”5 The United States internalized
this concept and expounded upon it through its legal system, establishing a
separate criminal justice system altogether for juveniles.6 In 1899, Cook
County in Illinois created the country’s first juvenile court, catalyzing a trend
that spread to almost every state in less than three decades.7 With this
movement to separate juvenile criminal justice from adult criminal justice
came an understanding that juveniles deserved different treatment in criminal
law than their adult counterparts.8 As such, juvenile courts across America
adopted rehabilitation as their primary purpose.9 This goal diverged from the
punitive goals that characterize the adult criminal justice system.10
This rehabilitative treatment of young offenders has remained a
component of the juvenile criminal justice system. However, in recent years,
the Supreme Court has made a substantial effort to expand upon this, carving
out distinct protections for juveniles.11 In the past ten years, the Court has
ruled that it is unconstitutional to subject juveniles to the death penalty, that
juveniles deserve individualized consideration in life without parole
sentences, and that a juvenile’s age must be taken into consideration when
analyzing Miranda waivers.12 The Supreme Court has acknowledged,
through these legal advancements, that a new body of psychological and
physiological science has changed what we know about adolescents, the
adolescent brain, and adolescent development—mainly that the brain is still
developing in its adolescent years in many key areas that impact decisionmaking skills and foreseeability.13
While the Supreme Court has taken a multitude of steps to expand the

4

BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *22.
Id.
6
ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 5.
7
Id.
8
See id.
9
Samantha Buckingham, Trauma Informed Juvenile Justice, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 641,
666–67 (2016).
10
Id.
11
Among those protections are protection from life without parole punishments,
protections from the identical analysis of Miranda waivers that pertain to adults, and the
protection from the death penalty. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264–65 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
12
Miller, 567 U.S. at 465; J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 264–65; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper,
543 U.S. at 578–79.
13
Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 n.5.
5
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rights and protections of juveniles, courts in the state of Illinois have taken
similar steps to substantially develop and expand the State’s law of
accountability.14 Though the Supreme Court’s developments in the areas of
juvenile law are reasonably viewed as progressive in their protection of
juveniles, changes in Illinois accountability law are increasingly expansive
and broaden the reach of accountability law.15 In Illinois, accountability law
is not a separate crime but rather a method courts use to prosecute individuals
when the individual was not the primary actor but provided some semblance
of assistance.16 Juveniles have not been so lucky to escape the grasp of this
extraordinarily powerful law and are prosecuted in an identical manner as
their adult counterparts.17 While the law has changed in many areas to
adeptly recognize the new psychological and physiological findings about
young people, accountability law in Illinois remains a substantial challenge
to overcome for juvenile offenders.18
This Comment argues that a new standard should be used to analyze the
culpability of juveniles adjudicated under the Illinois accountability statute.19
Part I.A begins with a brief survey of juvenile law in the United States. Then
Part I.B highlights the recent advancements in science and psychology
pertaining to adolescent brain development that were essential for the success
of the aforementioned cases. This is followed in Part I. C by an in-depth
analysis of the recent Supreme Court cases that have effectively established
different standards and new protections for juveniles during the Miranda
process and sentencing. Next, Part I. D presents the Illinois accountability
law as it stands today, illustrating the history and purpose of accountability
law and acknowledging the recent case law that has interpreted the statute
expansively, leading to its wide reach. Finally, Part II argues that the same
reasoning and understanding that the Supreme Court used to bolster its
holdings in these recent landmark decisions surrounding juveniles should be
used to inform an analysis of juvenile accountability in Illinois.

14

Michael G. Heyman, Clinging to the Common Law in an Age of Statutes: Criminal Law
in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 29, 33–34 (2014).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See Michael G. Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of
Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2013).
18
Id.
19
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5–2 (West 2017) (establishing when accountability exists in
crimes).
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I. WHY THIS PROBLEM EXISTS
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

The first pronounced element of America’s juvenile justice system
emerged through specialized institutions for juveniles, mainly those
convicted of truancy in large urban areas.20 These facilities, such as the
Society for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency and the Chicago Reform
School, were built upon the foundation of rehabilitating youth and separating
youth from adult offenders.21 In 1899, after 575 Chicago children were
convicted of various offenses within Cook County, Illinois was propelled to
establish a system of juvenile courts to adjudicate the children.22 These
courts did not serve a penal purpose.23 In fact, the juvenile court’s first chief
probation officer explained, “[i]nstead of reformation, the thought and idea
in the judge’s mind should always be formation . . . and [the child] certainly
cannot be reformed by punishing him.”24 Within twenty-five years, almost
every state in America had created a similar institution with similar
rehabilitative goals.25 During that time, Illinois remained steadfast in its
dedication to the reformation of young offenders.26 As Judge Julian Mack,
one of the first judges to preside over the juvenile court in Cook County,
explained, “[t]he child who must be brought into court should . . . be made to
feel that he is the object of [the state’s] care and solicitude.”27 Thus, in its
early years, the Illinois juvenile justice system sought to nurture and reform
the juvenile offenders that found their way into its grasp.
Case law that emerged in the following century echoed the treatment of
juveniles shown in the juvenile courts and sought to codify the appropriate
treatment of juveniles in the law.28 In 1984 in Clay v. State, three boys, all
under the age of sixteen, were charged and convicted of first degree murder.29
Though Florida’s Supreme Court upheld the convictions, the court cautioned
that all children under the age of seven possessed a conclusive presumption
20

ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 5; see generally William W.
Booth, History and Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, in FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND
PRACTICE (The Florida Bar ed., 13th ed. 2013).
21
ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 5.
22
Booth, supra note 20, at § 1.6 (2013).
23
David S. Tanenhaus, First Things First: Juvenile Justice Reform in Historical Context,
46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 282 (2013).
24
Id.
25
ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 5.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
People v. Olsen, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 649 (1984); Clay v. State, 143 Fla. 204, 207 (1940).
29
143 Fla. at 207.
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of innocence.30 This meant that a child under the age of seven could not be
found culpable regardless of the information provided by the prosecution.31
In 1984, the California Supreme Court further extended this presumption of
innocence in People v. Olsen, where the defendant allegedly raped a
fourteen-year-old and tried to use a mistake-of-age defense to avoid a
statutory rape conviction.32 According to Olsen, criminal law maintains that
all children between seven and fourteen have a rebuttable presumption of
incapacity.33 Though this presumption may be overcome, the burden to do
so rests entirely with the prosecution.34 In the same year that Olsen was
decided, a sixteen-year-old in Oklahoma received the death penalty for
murdering a police officer.35 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke
generally about the “condition” of youth rather than the specific implications
of a certain age. The Court explained that youth is more than a
“chronological fact” and creates a “condition of life when a person may be
most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”36 Thus, Olsen
opened the door for the Court to utilize age as a tool for reasoning in its
holdings.
In 1988, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court began using
dicta from these previous cases to expand upon the rights and privileges of
juveniles.37 In Thompson, the Supreme Court overturned a fifteen-year-old’s
death sentence.38 Though the Court upheld the child’s conviction of first
degree murder, the Court determined that a death sentence was inappropriate
for Thompson.39 The Court determined that the likelihood that a teenage
offender has made the kind of “cold blooded,” “cost-benefit analysis that
attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be
virtually nonexistent,” making a juvenile’s “irresponsible conduct . . . not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”40 In 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky,
30

Id. at 208.
Id.
32
36 Cal. 3d at 649.
33
Id. at 647. “Incapacity” in this sense means incapable of committing a crime. Because
children aged seven to fourteen have a rebuttable presumption of incapacity, they are not
always incapable of committing a crime. However, the term “rebuttable” means that the court
begins by assuming the child is not capable of committing the crime and it then falls on the
prosecution to present evidence to show why the child acted atypically.
34
Id. at 651.
35
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105–06 (1982).
36
Id. at 115.
37
487 U.S. 815 (1988).
38
Id. at 816.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 835, 837–38.
31
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an opinion by Justice Brennan recognized that juveniles are generally less
criminally responsible for their actions than their adult counterparts.41
However, though the Thompson Court held the sentence inappropriate for its
teenage offender, the Court did not yet extend this assumption to provide a
categorical ban on implementing the death penalty for all juvenile
offenders.42 Juveniles would need to wait fifteen years for the Court to
provide that guarantee.43
B. JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: A SCIENTIFIC
APPROACH

Following Stanford, a great deal of scientific research helped establish
that adults and adolescents differ in critical physical, mental, and emotional
abilities.44 For adolescents, these differences create obstacles in evaluating
the long-term effects of actions, thereby making it more likely that
adolescents will make poor decisions.45 Recent advances in Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (“MRI”) and psychological research have focused on the
frontal lobes of the adolescent brain.46 Such research has found that the
frontal lobe, which is responsible for planning and implementing behaviors
that are goal-directed, is the last portion of the brain to mature during
adolescence.47 Because adolescents do not have the full capacity of their
frontal lobe, this underdevelopment leads to challenges in decision-making,
foresight, strategic thinking, and risk management.48
It has been shown that the frontal lobe is divided into two systems: the
prefrontal cortex and the limbic system.49 The prefrontal cortex controls
41

See 492 U.S. 361, 377–78 (1989).
Id.
43
The death penalty was abolished for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005).
44
Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the
Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 114 (2013) (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication
of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 389, 391 (1999)).
45
Daniel Romer, Adolescent Risk Taking, Impulsivity, and Brain Development:
Implication for Prevention, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 263, 263 (2010).
46
See ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED
MIND 23 (2001).
47
See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8177 (2004).
48
See id.; Antonio R. Damasio & Steven W. Anderson, The Frontal Lobes, in CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 404, 434 (Kenneth M. Heilman & Edward Valenstein eds., 4th ed. 2003);
M.-Marsel Mesulam, Behavioral Neuroanatomy, in PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIORAL AND
COGNITIVE NEUROLOGY 1, 47–48 (M.-Marsel Mesulam ed., 2d ed. 2000).
49
See GOLDBERG, supra note 46, at 23.
42
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reasoning, planning, and impulsivity, while the limbic system controls
instinctual behavior such as the fight-or-flight response.50 Though these two
systems are balanced in a normal adult brain, such that reasoning abilities are
balanced with instinctual abilities, they are out of balance during the
developmental and growth stages of adolescence.51 The reason is that the
development of these two systems occurs at different rates.52 The limbic
system matures faster than the prefrontal cortex, which creates a high level
of instinctual behavior and leaves reasoning and planning for the final stages
in development.53 This imbalance creates emotionality and vulnerability,
causing teenagers to more heavily rely on the instinctual cues provided by
the limbic system than on rationality and reason provided by the prefrontal
cortex.54 As a result, these instinctual drives stimulate teenagers to “seek
higher levels of novelty and to take more risks.”55
The development of the adolescent brain causes juveniles to act
“impulsively and without full appreciation of the consequences” because
they possess a very limited amount of self-control.56 As adolescents grow
and mature, their cognitive abilities begin to rise to the level of adults;
however, during the time of growth, they do not have an ability to assess risks
and make decisions like a reasonable adult.57 This inability to assess risks
results in a “willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial risks . . .
for the sake of such experiences.”58
This inherent risk-taking behavior, manifested in immature judgment,
also reveals a decreased sense of foreseeability that provides an additional
challenge to adolescent decision-making.59 First, adolescents have a
diminished ability to foresee consequences because they lack the experience
that is necessary to properly anticipate the consequences of their actions.60
Therefore, adolescents do not base their decisions on consequences they can
anticipate based on experience, but based on the instinctual feelings
50

Id.
Kevin Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court’s Limitations on Juvenile
Punishment, TEX. TECH L. REV. 339, 351 (2013).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 822
(2003).
56
Feld, supra note 44, at 109.
57
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 813.
58
See MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS AND BIOSOCIAL BASES OF
SENSATION SEEKING 27 (1994).
59
See Mesulam, supra note 48, at 47–48.
60
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 813–14.
51
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stemming from the limbic system.61
In addition to this lack of experience, adolescents are less efficient at
processing information. Therefore, when they are calculating potential
consequences of an action, adolescents are unable to quickly determine
foreseeable consequences and then make a rational decision based upon those
consequences.62 Thus, adolescents make quick decisions that are impulsive
and less reliable when compared to adults.63 Furthermore, adolescents
generally are less future-oriented in their thinking than adults. This makes
adolescents less likely to even weigh the consequences of their actions in the
first place.64 Because children and teenagers tend to think short term, they
may not think “realistically about what may occur” as a result of their
actions.65
Adolescents simply cannot weigh the costs and benefits of an action in
a way that reasonable adults can.66 While juveniles may be capable of
making rational decisions in a calm and patient setting, a stressful
environment dramatically compromises their ability to make those same
thoughtful decisions.67 Furthermore, even though adolescents may be able to
cursorily weigh consequences and benefits in stressful situations, they do so
in a way that is much different than adults.68 Adolescents strongly overvalue
the gains from impulsivity, enjoyment, and peer approval.69 Conversely, they
undervalue the true consequences and potential for loss due to their inability
to foresee the comprehensive and long-term consequences.70
While it is challenging for adolescents to make quick and rational
decisions, they also have a psychological disposition towards certain
sensation-seeking characteristics that cause adolescents “to undertake risky
behaviors.”71 Compared with individuals at other ages and stages of
61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in
the Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 313 (2012).
66
Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on
Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 271, 273 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
67
Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1782 (1995).
68
See LAURENCE STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE 88 (6th ed. 2002).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., KIDS ARE DIFFERENT: HOW KNOWLEDGE OF
ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT THEORY CAN AID DECISION-MAKING IN COURT 8 (2000).
62
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development, adolescents “exhibit a disproportionate amount of reckless
behavior, sensation seeking, and risk taking.”72 This behavior, however, is
at least in part due to adolescents’ inability to perceive and evaluate the costs
and benefits of their actions in the same way that adults do.73
While adolescents attempt to navigate decision-making under a variety
of inherent obstacles, they are also incredibly vulnerable and susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures.74 Adolescents are uniquely
vulnerable in peer pressure situations because they have less independence
and experience with controlling their own environment, and thus are more
likely to follow the actions of others.75 This vulnerability stems from an
inability to manage behavior in the “face of pressure from others to violate
the law, or to extricate oneself from a potentially problematic situation.”76
The challenges adolescents face in removing themselves from problematic or
dangerous circumstances result from both a physical inability to direct certain
behavior and an inability to escape situations.77 In many cases, adolescents
are physically unable to leave their environment because they cannot move,
drive, or leave and thus rely on adults to dictate choices that influence their
environment.78 Additionally, criminal activity is “sometimes rewarded with
higher status” in groups of teenagers, thus encouraging adolescents to engage
in such behavior.79 Because youth may value certain social benefits
differently than adults, they are likely to view approval from peers as
incredibly valuable and eliciting of increased rewards.80 This value system,
in tandem with adolescents’ decreased foreseeability, incites them to act for
the immediate gains offered by peer approval, without proper evaluation of
the criminal consequences.81
Though these psychological characteristics characterize the period of
72

L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV 417, 421 (2000).
73
See Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective,
12 DEV. REV. 339, 350–53 (1992).
74
Spear, supra note 72, at 423 (explaining that the decision-making process of adolescents
“may be more vulnerable to disruption by the stresses and strains of everyday living”).
75
Keller, supra note 65, at 314.
76
Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 44, at 407.
77
Christopher Slobogin, Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and
Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 132 n.161 (2013) (citing
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 26–27 (2011) (“[E]scape from risk-inducing environments is more
difficult for dependent children than for adults.”)).
78
Id.
79
Keller, supra note 65, at 314.
80
See ZUCKERMAN, supra note 58, at 27.
81
Id.
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adolescence, the transient nature of the adolescent personality marks another
important hallmark of this period of development.82 Adolescent personalities
are generally more dynamic because of a greater amount of perceived stress
and drastic hormonal fluctuations.83 This, in turn, causes teenagers to
“experience emotional states that are more extreme, more variable, and less
predictable than those experienced by children or adults.”84 These ranging
and unpredictable emotions often account for the seemingly irrational
criminal acts for which many juvenile offenders are adjudicated.85
Conversely, this same malleable personality, which can be blamed for many
of the delinquent acts of juvenile offenders, can also be credited as providing
the potential for positive change.86 Therefore, the actions, criminal or
otherwise, that occur on one day do not necessarily reflect the permanent
disposition of the juvenile offender.87 In fact, malleability of the adolescent
personality makes it far more likely for youth to positively change in a period
of fewer months or years than it would an adult who committed the same
crime.88
Psychological research also provides insight as to the influence of peers
on brain activity, suggesting that the presence of peers neurologically
stimulates the reward center of the brain.89 The reward stimulation that
comes as a result of peer interaction often leads to an increase in risk taking
and reckless action that tends to ensue with a group of teenagers.90 The sheer
number of juvenile cases that have co-defendants illustrates this occurrence,
exemplifying the fact that juveniles are more likely to commit crimes with
their peers than alone.91 This phenomenon, however, is better explained by
using psychological research about the adolescent brain as a lens to view
these crimes.92 Differences in the adolescent brain, both psychologically and
82

Brief for A.B.A. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellant at 11–12, Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412 and 08-7621), 2009 WL 2197339 (citing Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
83
Spear, supra note 72, at 429.
84
Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 67, at 1782.
85
See, e.g., Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty,
13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 117–19 (2007).
86
Feld, supra note 44, at 148 (citing Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’
Responses’ to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST.: AN ANN. REV. 189 (1998)).
87
Id.
88
Elizabeth Scott et. al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in A Constitutional Framework, 88
TEMP. L. REV. 675, 679 (2016).
89
See, e.g., Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing
Activity in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14:2 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F2.
90
Id. at F7.
91
Id. at F1, F7.
92
Id.

TROUTMAN

208

1/25/18 11:24 AM

Troutman

[Vol. 108

biologically, from the adult brain lead to challenges in decision-making and
obstacles in resisting peer pressure.93 The normal adolescent brain, simply
put, has limitations that not only encourage engagement in reckless activities
but also limit an adolescent’s ability to fight against such impulses.94
C. JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: THE SUPREME COURT’S
APPROACH

In the past decade, there has been a consistent trend by courts, including
the Supreme Court, to evaluate juveniles differently than their adult
counterparts.95 Beginning in 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons
declared it unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to the death penalty.96 This
was the case to finally provide a categorical ban on sentencing juveniles to
death.97 In this case, the Court overturned a seventeen-year-old defendant’s
death sentence that resulted from a conviction of first-degree murder.98 The
Supreme Court determined that because a juvenile possessed a degree of
“diminished culpability,” it rendered a death sentence unconstitutional for
such an adolescent under the Eighth Amendment.99 In its reasoning, the
Court synthesized recent scientific findings about adolescent development.100
Its synthesis established “three general differences between juveniles under
18 and adults,” which were (1) “a lack of maturity and . . . responsibility . . .
[that] often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions;” (2)
increased vulnerability to negative influences and exposure to peer pressure;
and (3) the distinct “personality traits of juveniles” which were “more
transitory” resulting in the malleable personality of a juvenile.101 Roper
opened the door for a series of Supreme Court decisions that would
dramatically safeguard the rights of juveniles.
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that a life without
parole sentence for non-homicide juvenile offenders was also
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.102 Graham, however, went
93

09.

94

Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 813; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 44, at 407–

Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 813.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S.
261, 261 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005).
96
543 U.S. at 568.
97
Id. at 560.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 570–71.
100
Id. at 569–70.
101
Id.
102
560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010).
95
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one step further than simply providing a categorical ban of life without parole
sentences for such offenders.103 In its reasoning, the Court affirmatively
recognized that adolescents are deserving of a “meaningful opportunity” for
rehabilitation.104 This created the new standard to evaluate juvenile
sentences: the “meaningful opportunity” standard.105 This standard requires
sentences to consider time for maturity and rehabilitation, thus a “meaningful
opportunity.”106
In 2011, just one year after Graham, the Court in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina ruled that a child’s age must be taken into account for the purposes
of a Miranda analysis.107 This holding effectively relied on Eddings v.
Oklahoma, where the Court held that a child’s age is “more than a
chronological fact,”108 in establishing how age “would have affected how a
reasonable person” in police custody “would perceive his or her freedom to
leave.”109 In J.D.B., the Court’s explanation of a child’s perception during
the Miranda process also relied upon the common understanding of children
acknowledged in Graham as well as social science and cognitive science.110
In 2011, Miller v. Alabama extended the ruling in Graham even further,
holding that mandatory life without the possibility of parole sentences for
juveniles charged with homicide were unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution.111 The holding in Miller was confirmed and
expanded in Montgomery v. Louisiana, where the Court’s holding
determined that the Miller decision applies retroactively to all cases
nationwide.112 This opened the door for all juveniles previously sentenced to
life without parole to appeal and possibly receive a lesser sentence that would
provide the opportunity to spend some portion of their lives outside prison.113
Analyzing Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and Montgomery in conjunction
with one another establishes a new body of juvenile law that is premised on
103

Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
564 U.S. 261, 261 (2011).
108
Id. at 271–72.
109
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
110
J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273 n.5 (“Although citation to social science and cognitive science
authorities is unnecessary to establish these commonsense propositions, the literature confirms
what experience bears out.”). See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (“[D]evelopments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and
adult minds.”).
111
560 U.S. 460, 487 (2012).
112
136 S. Ct. 718, 744 (2016).
113
Id. at 723.
104
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the understanding that juveniles are categorically different from adults.114
Therefore, in order for courts to treat adolescents effectively and
constitutionally under the law, courts must take into account the scientific
and common sense understanding of adolescent behavior.115
These landmark cases throughout the past decade have established that
juveniles are not only categorically different from adults but also that the law
must treat juveniles differently from adults based on these stark
differences.116 The Supreme Court based this distinction, which is now
accepted as law, by using “common sense . . . what ‘any parent knows’” and
by acknowledging advancements in psychology and social science that have
led to an increased knowledge concerning the brain development of
adolescents, which further informed our understanding of juvenile
offenders.117 These landmark cases also show that the Court not only
acknowledges the advancements, but is willing to take into account new and
cutting-edge psychological science that explains the difference between
adults and adolescents if such research creates a more appropriate and just
legal standard.118 Moreover, the Court has accepted the understanding of the
plasticity of the adolescent brain as well as the duration of adolescence to
explain that choices made during that period of development do not
necessarily reflect a permanent and lasting future of recidivism but rather the
possibility for rehabilitation and positive change.119 This understanding has
come to play a key role in the Court’s assessment of the criminal choices
made by adolescents—both in assessing the level of moral culpability to
assign to an adolescent who commits a delinquent act and in assessing the
proportionate consequences that an adolescent should face as a result of such
a choice.120
The characteristics of juveniles that the Court has specially noted in
114
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 723; Miller, 560 U.S. at 487; J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 261;
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
115
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 723; Miller, 560 U.S. at 487; J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 261;
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
116
Miller, 560 U.S. at 477 (explaining that a judge “misses too much if he treats every
child as an adult” because the juvenile has such distinct characteristics that distinguish them
from an adult, “among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences”).
117
Id. at 470–71 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
118
Id. at 472 n.5 (“The evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that the science
and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even
stronger.”).
119
Id. at 472 (explaining that the “rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess
consequences” are lessened “as the years go by and neurological development occurs so that
‘deficiencies will be reformed’”) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
120
Id.
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support of its holdings are (1) the immaturity of youth and failure to
demonstrate mature judgment, (2) the susceptibility of youth to peer pressure,
and (3) the potential for reform that adolescents exhibit because of the
developmental phase that characterizes adolescence.121 Together, these
characteristics create a decision-making process distinctly different from
adults, inhibited by cognitive differences, psychosocial senses, and
neurological deficits.122 Delving into these characteristics of juveniles and
the developmental phase of their brains, the Court has understood that
juveniles possess a diminished ability to accurately foresee and weigh risks
and benefits.123 This makes juveniles less adept at envisioning danger
inherent in their conduct as well as anticipating consequences that are likely
to result from their activity.124 Therefore, adolescents are less able to discern
whether the risks associated with their conduct are justified.125
D. ACCOUNTABILITY LAW: ILLINOIS’S APPROACH

It has long been established through the foundation of criminal law that
to be found guilty of a crime, there must have been a showing of actus reus,
the criminal act, in addition to a showing of mens rea, the criminal mindset.126
Accountability law side-steps this two-part requirement by resting upon the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.127 This doctrine allows a court
to convict a defendant, who did not necessarily commit the end crime, in the
same manner and magnitude as the court would convict the principal actor,
the individual who committed the crime in question.128 The doctrine is rooted
in the premise that individuals should be held responsible if the “subsequent
crime was a foreseeable consequence of the first, no matter how
indistinct.”129 In so doing, the doctrine paves the road for the courts to
convict individuals of a subsequent act or a different individual with only
121

Roper, 542 U.S. at 569–70.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
See generally Evan Goldstick, Accidental Vitiation: The Natural and Probable
Consequence of Rosemond v. United States on the Natural and Probable Consequence
Doctrine, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (2016).
127
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5–2 (West 2017); Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and
Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM.
L. 388, 395 (2010).
128
Heyman, supra note 127, at 395.
129
Id. This far-reaching relationship between the first act and the act for which the
defendant is being convicted is known as the “common design” theory of accountability—the
design is the path created between the first and last act. Id.
122
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minimal regard to the necessary mental intent.130 Essentially, the doctrine of
natural and probable consequences allows a defendant to be found guilty
without the necessary mens rea, through another individual’s actus reus.131
In this way, accountability theory stretches beyond the original requirements
necessary to prove culpability and widens the net available to convict
individuals.132 Thus, accountability theory has created an avenue of criminal
liability which is derived from another’s actions, the principal actor.133 While
each state has crafted its own definition of accountability through legislation,
many states have also relied upon case law to interpret the contours of this
highly subjective area of law.134
Throughout the country, Illinois has been highlighted for upholding
convictions that illustrated some of the most liberal and expansive uses of
accountability theory.135 Though the statute has undergone significant
change since its inception, the most recent change to the accountability law
statute in Illinois occurred in 2010,136 enacting the following version of the
statute which governs Illinois accountability law today:
§ 5–2. When accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of
another when:
(a) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes
another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal
incapacity lacks such a mental state;
(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her so accountable; or
(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote
or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid
that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.
When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts
in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be
the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible
for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does
130

Goldstick, supra note 126, at 1310.
Id.
132
Michael G. Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of
Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 129 (2013).
133
Id. (citing Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985)).
134
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2, at 510–11 (1978).
135
People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 30 (Ill. 1974); Heyman, supra note 127, at 397
(describing Kessler as a case of the man in the “wrong place at the wrong time” who was
convicted of two counts of attempted murder); People v. Williams, 64 N.E.3d 1086, 1100 at ¶
62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (Hyman, J., concurring) (holding that an individual need not even
commit any crime at all to be convicted of another crime under accountability theory).
136
Ill. P.A. 96–710, § 25 (effective Jan. 1, 2010).
131
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not render a person accountable for an offense; a person’s presence at the scene of a
crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when
137
determining accountability.
A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute defining the offense provides
otherwise, if:
(1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed;
(2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct was inevitably incident to its
commission; or
(3) before the commission of the offense, he or she terminates his or her effort to
promote or facilitate that commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly deprives
his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that commission, (ii) gives timely warning to
the proper law enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent
138
the commission of the offense.

Accountability is not in and of itself a crime; rather, an accountability
statute is a mechanism through which a criminal conviction may be
reached.139 Under the Illinois statute and established through case law, the
prosecution can establish a defendant’s intent by showing either that the
defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal actor, or by showing that
there was a common criminal design in which the defendant engaged.140 The
Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Fernandez, clarified that the rule for
common design remains that, “where one aids another in the planning or
commission of an offense, he is legally accountable for the conduct of the
person he aids[] and that the word ‘conduct’ encompasses any criminal act
done in furtherance of the planned and intended act.”141 In Fernandez, the
court compared accountability under common design to two prior cases:
People v. Taylor and People v. Dennis. In both cases, the defendant was the
driver of a car whose passenger, unbeknownst to the defendant, intended to
commit a crime.142 The Illinois Supreme Court classified these cases as
belonging in the shared specific-intent category of accountability cases. This
meant that the defendant shared the intent of the passenger with the actual
137

People v. Taylor, 646 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ill. 1995).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5–2 (West 2017).
139
People v. Hicks, 693 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ill. 1998). Person who commits offense under
accountability principle can be charged and tried under indictment for substantive offense
since accountability is not offense in itself but merely alternative to nature of proof required
to convict for substantive offense. People v. Buffington, 366 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977);
People v. Williams, 328 N.E.2d 682, 683–84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
140
People v. Fernandez, 6 N.E.3d 145, ¶ 13 at 149–50 (Ill. 2014) (citing In re W.C., 657
N.E.2d 908 (Ill. 1995)).
141
Id.
142
People v. Taylor, 712 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 1999); People v. Dennis, 692 N.E.2d 325, 336
(Ill. 1998).
138
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intent to commit the crime. Though the defendant did not know that any type
of crime was going to be committed, the court used accountability theory to
convict these defendants.143
In Fenandez and other cases, the court has consistently held that mere
presence at a crime scene is not enough to render a person accountable for
the acts of another.144 However, Illinois courts have also held that active
participation is unnecessary to impose guilt, and a defendant may aid and
abet a crime without participating in the overt act.145 This, however, has
created a gray area of what pushes a defendant beyond “mere presence.”146
In an attempt to help clarify this, courts have enumerated six factors that may
be considered in determining whether a person is accountable for the acts of
the primary actor. These factors are: (1) the defendant’s presence during the
commission of the crime without any attempt to disassociate oneself from the
crime, (2) acting as a lookout, (3) flight from the scene, (4) continued
association with the perpetrator after the criminal act, (5) failure to report the
incident, and (6) acceptance of illegal proceeds of the crime.147 While these
factors, in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances, can be
considered in determining accountability, none is dispositive.148 Beyond
“mere presence” may also be proven by circumstantial evidence. Thus, while
direct evidence may be helpful, it is not necessary.149
In September 2016, the Illinois Appellate Court solidified the expansive
reach of the common design theory of accountability in People v. Williams.150
In Williams, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Williams
for first-degree murder through the accountability theory.151 Williams was
with a number of other gang members when he participated in an altercation
on a train platform with members of a rival gang.152 One member of the rival
gang fell while running on the train tracks and died from electrocution.153
The court determined that Williams could be found guilty through
accountability by common design.154 The court reasoned that “by attaching

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Fernandez, 6 N.E.3d, at ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶ 21; Dennis, 692 N.E.2d, at 336; Taylor, 646 N.E.2d at 57.
Taylor, 712 N.E.2d, at 328–29.
People v. McComb, 728 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
Id.
Id.
People v. Manley, 274 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971).
People v. Williams, 64 N.E.3d 1086, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1098.
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himself to a group bent on illegal action, defendant became accountable for
all the crimes of his companions.”155 The court reasoned that proof of the
common criminal design did not need to be supported by actual words of
agreement, but could be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the act.156 Thus, Illinois accountability theory, through a
common design premise, expanded with Williams to encompass “any acts in
the furtherance of that common design” committed by any party that was
privy to the original plan.157 In this way, the common design theory of
accountability in Illinois provides an incredibly expansive mechanism for
convicting offenders of criminal acts in which they did not partake and never
intended to partake.158
II. ARGUING FOR A DIFFERENT JUVENILE STANDARD OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Within the eleven years since Roper was decided, scientific and
psychological advancements in the understanding of the adolescent brain
have been used to assist the Supreme Court in both instituting categorical
bans on various sentences for juveniles and in establishing a new standard to
analyze Miranda waivers that requires age to be a factor considered in the
analysis.159 Through these landmark decisions, the Court has determined that
the age of the accused, especially for young offenders, is essential to consider
in two important stages of criminal procedure—interrogations and
sentencing.160 While the Court has made explicit the need to consider age in
these stages, the Court has yet to address the consideration of age in the guilt
phase.161
Justice Kennedy, using science and common sense, explained in Roper
that “the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear
when an individual turns 18.”162 Following Justice Kennedy’s determination,
the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear the
moment they walk into a courtroom. The qualities that the Court has used to
155

Id.
Id. at 1096.
157
Id. at 1098.
158
See id.
159
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–72 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 76 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
160
Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery all placed categorical bans on certain
sentences based on youth while J.D.B. held that age is necessary for a proper Miranda analysis.
161
For the purpose of this comment, I will be using “guilt phase” to refer to the phase
beginning when a child is adjudicated for a specific crime and ending when he or she is
determined guilty or innocent for said crime. Essentially, “guilt phase” encompasses the
determination of whether or not an alleged offender is or can be guilty of said crime.
162
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
156
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dictate the treatment of juveniles during interrogation and during sentencing
do not disappear during the guilt phase. A juvenile’s age should continue to
be used during the determination of his or her guilt and the culpability for the
crime of which he or she has been accused.
Accountability law, specifically in Illinois, fails to do this. Illinois
accountability law views the decision to engage in any crime, misdemeanor
or otherwise, as the only necessary element to support a conviction on
accountability theory.163 Because accountability is derived from that first
decision that a defendant makes to engage in a crime, it is important to assess
the factors that go into that first decision. And because the Supreme Court
has acknowledged the factors that make adolescents categorically different
from adults, these factors should also be used in the assessment of that first
decision. Therefore, analyzing accountability theory for juveniles should be
categorically different than analyzing accountability theory for adults.
The factors and characteristics of juveniles that the Court has both
accepted and emphasized in their previous landmark decisions establish a
new body of law. By using this body of law to inform the analysis of
accountability cases for juvenile offenders, it makes clear that accountability
theory is unconstitutional when used to adjudicate juveniles. Accountability
theory in Illinois, specifically the common design theory, holds every
individual who engages in one single illegal act accountable for all illegal
acts that result as a consequence, even if the consequences vary greatly from
the initial act.164 Individuals convicted under accountability theory are
treated identically as the individuals who were the primary actors in the
crime, regardless of the level of participation or the intent of the supporting
actors.165 While other states still maintain the term “accessory,” allowing for
various options to convict individuals as “accessory before the fact” or
“accessory after the fact,” and thus opening the door for different levels of
culpability in accountability cases, Illinois has no such options.166 All
individuals convicted under accountability theory face the same
consequences regardless of their degree of participation.167
The common design theory then expands this to disregard not only
163
“When two or more persons join together to commit an offense, even ‘a minor offense
which involves violence,’ the parties are responsible for ‘everything’ that occurs as a result of
the agreement.” People v. Williams, 64 N.E.3d 1086, 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
164
Id.
165
Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 97 (1985).
166
1–3 Ill. Crim. Law § 3.03 (2015).
167
Id.; Michael G. Heyman, Due Process Limits on Accomplice Liability, 99 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTES 131, 132 (2015).
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degree of participation but also to disregard the intent of the actor to commit
the charged crime.168 It is the common design theory of accountability that
holds individuals vicariously liable for the actions of another.169 A century
ago, this particular mechanism of deriving guilt was used to hold those
accountable in instances such as a tavern owner whose employee sells liquor
to a minor.170 While that conviction would still stand today, the more
contemporary cases of common design accountability theory have been used
for sweeping convictions of members of gangs who were either at the scene
of a crime committed by their gang member or have involved themselves in
some capacity in a criminal act.171 Again, this common design theory of
accountability is based on the very first decision made by a defendant. It may
be a decision to engage in a criminal act or it may be the decision to attach
oneself “to a group bent on illegal acts.”172 Whatever that decision may be,
or however minor the decision, the courts in Illinois have determined that the
first decision made by an actor carries with it the responsibility of all
subsequent decisions, creating accountability theory.
For adult accountability convictions, this rationale makes sense. Adults,
with fully developed brains, have the ability to foresee the consequences of
their actions or to understand that their actions, no matter how minor, have
consequences that may even be unintended.173 Adults are capable of
weighing the costs and benefits of a particular crime and can think
realistically about the array of possibilities that attach themselves to a single
crime.174 In doing so, reasonable adults are capable of anticipating that one
crime can lead to a completely different crime. Whether or not adults do
actually consider the foreseeability of these potential crimes or go through
the process of weighing costs and benefits is irrelevant; rather, it is their
ability to consider such consequences that renders them guilty.175 This is
because capacity is the driving force behind a guilty verdict in all crimes.176

168

Id.
Id.
170
Id.
171
People v. Williams, 64 N.E.3d 1086, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
172
Id. at 1097. A group bent on illegal acts has been commonly used as a primary factor
in convicting gang members in large groups from the act of one single individual.
173
See Mesulam, supra note 48, at 47–48.
174
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 812–13.
175
The State must prove that “the accused had sufficient mentality to distinguish
between right and wrong as to the particular act, and that he was capable of exercising
the power to choose between the right and the wrong.”	
  	
  
People v. Munroe, 154 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. 1958).
169

176

Id.

TROUTMAN

218

1/25/18 11:24 AM

Troutman

[Vol. 108

The decision-making abilities that exist in an adult brain and thereby
weigh in favor of guilt in adult accountability cases are the same decisionmaking abilities that are in developmental stages in the brains of adolescents.
Adolescent brains simply have not developed to the point where adolescents
are able to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions in the same way
as adults.177 Because their decision-making process is simply incompatible
with that of an adult, a theory of guilt justification, which relies so heavily on
that decision-making process, is unjust when applied to juveniles. If a
juvenile does not have the capacity for such decision-making, then the
juvenile should be held less culpable for the crimes that ensue as a result of
such decisions. This is particularly true in homicide cases, as the Court in
Graham held that “when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender
who did not kill . . . has twice diminished moral culpability” and as such,
“defendants who do not . . . foresee that life will be taken are categorically
less deserving of such punishments than are murderers.”178 Because the traits
of juveniles that make them categorically different from adults exist for the
entire duration of their time in a courtroom, Graham’s determination of
diminished culpability should be extended from consideration of punishment
to determining guilt.
Some may argue that the punishment phase allows for this consideration
of age, foreseeability, and decision-making and therefore provides juveniles
with enough protection. However, the only way to ensure that juveniles are
protected from accountability law is to categorically shield juveniles from
accountability theory as it currently exists in Illinois. Accountability theory
holds all actors as guilty as the individual who committed the act, which will
have life-changing consequences to individuals. In many cases, like that in
People v. Williams, it takes merely an intent to commit some offense for
individuals to be held accountable for first degree murder.179 Courts in
Illinois have used this very mechanism to find juveniles guilty through
accountability and in many cases, impose harsh punishments as a result.180
177

Feld, supra note 44, at 109.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010).
179
64 N.E.3d 1086, 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); People v. Dukes, 263 Ill. App. 3d 765, 769–
70 (1994).
180
Williams, 64 N.E.3d at 1100 (upholding the conviction of a sixteen-year-old sentenced
to twenty-one years of imprisonment through accountability theory); People v. Wilson, No.
09–CF–426, 2015 WL 6549597 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 28, 2015), appeal denied 48 N.E.3d 677
(Ill. 2016) (upholding the transfer of a fourteen-year-old to adult criminal court when charged
with murder through accountability); People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 309 (Ill. 2002)
(overturning a sentence of life without parole for a fifteen-year-old who served as a lookout
during a murder but explaining that the ruling “does not imply that a sentence of life
imprisonment for a juvenile offender convicted under a theory of accountability is never
178
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While Graham suggests that juveniles can be protected by more lenient
punishments without necessarily altering the guilt phase, too many
intangibles exist that can result in juveniles facing the same life-altering
consequences.181 For starters, judicial discretion presents the opportunity for
judges to punish juveniles to the same extent as adults. Though this judicial
power quite possibly could result in fairer treatment of juveniles, judicial
discretion works both ways. Judges may treat juveniles fairer. However,
judges may also treat juveniles the same as adults, delivering identical
sentences. In State v. Roby, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that
juveniles could be sentenced to a period of incarceration that would deny
possibility of parole only after evaluating the juvenile using the mitigating
factors of youth.182 This is an instance where the judicial discretion rejected
the understanding of juveniles and the intent behind this new body of law
adopted in Miller.
Even though judicial discretion could, in some circumstances, alleviate
the sting of the sentencing that accompanies convictions under accountability
theory, sentencing guidelines make it impossible for judges to entirely erase
the impact of accountability theory on a juvenile.183 In People v. Miller, a
fifteen-year-old gang member stood outside a home while his two fellow
gang members searched the neighborhood for members of a rival gang.184
After hearing gunshots, Miller ran to his girlfriend’s house. Miller was
charged with two counts of first degree murder, transferred to adult court,
and sentenced to fifty years.185 Though the judge’s hands were tied in the
conviction stage, he was able to comment on the effects of accountability
theory. Judge Linn explained that he was “very concerned about what this
meant . . . to society at large, to be part of a society where a fifteen-year-old
child on a theory of accountability only, passive accountability, would suffer”
because the child was only “passively acting as a look out for other people,
never picked up a gun, never had much more than—perhaps a minute—to
contemplate what this entire incident is about, and he is in the same situation
as a serial killer . . . .”186 In this case, while judicial discretion was helpful, it
also had its limitations. The judge was required to follow the law of
accountability and uphold the finding of guilt.187 It is for this reason, among
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many others, that the Court in Graham v. Florida, determined a categorical
ban was necessary for the protection of juveniles. The Court reasoned that “a
categorical rule avoids the risk that, as a result of these difficulties, a court or
jury will erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is sufficiently
culpable,” and thus using their discretion, will instill upon a juvenile the same
consequences as an adult.188
The example in People v. Miller provides the exact rationale for
implementing a categorical ban on convicting juveniles under accountability
theory. In Graham v. Florida, a categorical ban was appropriate “because
this case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class
of offenders who have committed a range of crimes, the appropriate analysis
is the categorical approach used in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy.”189
Accountability theory also utilizes a particular method of conviction that
implicates individuals who have committed a wide variety of crimes and just
as in Graham, this ban should apply to an entire class of offenders—
juveniles.
There are certainly concerns that derive from any categorical ban. In
Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy acknowledged, “[d]rawing the line at 18
years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against
categorical rules.”190 This is because it is difficult to draw a line in the sand
because “the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear
when an individual turns 18” and “[b]y the same token, some under 18 have
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”191 Even
with that concern however, the Court in Roper determined that the stark
differences between juveniles and adults are so pronounced and have such
overarching effects into the criminal justice system that “a line must be
drawn.”192 More good is served by shielding the vast majority of adolescents
from the sharp and irreparable sting of accountability theory than harm done
by the miniscule number of adolescents that present those traits of an adult.
The categorical approach was necessary in Graham, just like it is necessary
in all accountability cases because “it does not follow that courts taking a
case-by-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy
distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have
the capacity for change.”193 Following this logic, it is more appropriate to
implement a categorical rule protecting juveniles than to allow courts
188
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discretion to consider the facts of a case and a juvenile offender individually.
This stance is congruent with numerous societal standards beyond the
criminal justice system. Though society recognizes that not all adolescents
mature and develop at the same rate, certain rules are uniformly applied to
every adolescents.194
A categorical ban also increases efficiency and decreases the chance for
error on the part of the Court. Accountability theory includes a vast array of
factors that a court can choose to evaluate or ignore. Used in determining
guilt, these factors range from fleeing the scene, to continuing to associate
with the individuals involved, to acting as a lookout. Beyond these tangible
factors, courts are free to interpret from the circumstances whether or not an
individual is guilty under accountability theory. This, in turn, gives the court
a great deal of discretion and becomes the basis of many appeals. Eliminating
accountability theory for juveniles would save both time and resources in the
courts, avoiding costly and time-consuming litigation.
CONCLUSION
Simply put, juveniles are different from adults. This concept was a
cornerstone of American common law and more recently has been the focus
of a great deal of Supreme Court jurisprudence. These distinctions have built
an entire criminal system solely for juveniles and have restricted juveniles
from a myriad of privileges conferred upon adults⎯voting, drinking, serving
in the military. In the past decade, landmark decisions have been handed
down by the Supreme Court solidifying the legal importance of these
distinctions. In sum, the Supreme Court has determined that juveniles are
categorically different from adults, and the law must acknowledge that stark
dissimilarity. Because juveniles are now provided protection from the death
penalty, life without parole, and an age-inclusive Miranda analysis, it is vital
to examine the Court’s logic. Doing so leads one to an understanding that
these differences between juveniles and adults do not dissipate during the
conviction stage. In accountability cases, where the law seems as far
reaching and all-encompassing as it could possibly be, it is vital for courts to
utilize the same logic and body of law that has structured Miller, Roper,
Graham, and J.D.B. This body of law will lead to only one just conclusion—
the justifications for imposing accountability theory simply do not exist for
juveniles due to the psychological factors that render them poor decision
makers, easily influenced, and near-sighted. For this reason, accountability
theory is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles and should be categorically
abolished.
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